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Abstract The objective of this paper is the definition of a 
new methodology for carrying out security risk 
assessment in the air traffic management (ATM) domain 
so as to enhance security awareness and integrate secure 
and cost-effective design objectives.  
This process is carried out by modelling the system, 
identifying the assets, threats and vulnerabilities, 
prioritizing the threats and proposing cost-effective 
countermeasures for the weaknesses found.  
ATM security is concerned with securing ATM assets in 
order to prevent threats and limit their effects on the 
overall aviation network. This effect limitation can be 
achieved by removing the vulnerability from the system 
and/or increasing the tolerance in case of component 
failures due to attacks.  
The security risk assessment methodology proposed is 
based on what is currently being done by the industry 
(the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
and the International Standard Organization (ISO), etc.). 
Keywords Security, Risk, Methodology, ATM 
1. Introduction  
Concerns about security have been raised in the past, but 
the tragic events of 9/11 thrust the issue of security into 
public domain as never before and set in motion responses 
that are re-shaping transportation in unforeseen ways. 
Physical security of airports has been the focus of security 
concerns for many decades. Hijacking aircraft came to the 
fore in the 1970s, when terrorist groups in the Middle 
East exploited the lack of security to commandeer planes 
for ransom and publicity. Refugees fleeing dictatorships 
also saw the taking over of aircraft as a possible route to 
freedom. In response, the airline industry and the 
international regulatory body, the ICAO, established 
screening procedures for passengers and bags. This 
process seems to have worked in the short-run, at least, 
with reductions in hijackings, although terrorists changed 
their tactics by placing bombs in un-accompanied 
luggage and packages (as for example in the Air India 
crash off Ireland in 1985 and the Lockerbie, Scotland, 
crash of Pan Am 103 in 1988).  
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Because passengers were being routed by hubs, the 
numbers of passengers in transit through the hub airports 
grew significantly. Concerns were being raised by some 
security experts, but the costs of improving screening and 
the need to process ever larger numbers of passengers 
and maintain flight schedules caused most carriers to 
oppose tighter security measures.  
The situation was changed irrevocably by the events of 
September 11, 2001. Security involves many steps, from 
restricting access to airport facilities and fortifying 
cockpits, to the more extensive security screening of 
passengers. Screening now involves more rigorous 
inspections of passengers and their baggage at airports. 
The imposition of these measures has come at a 
considerable cost. The purchase of improved screening 
machines and the re-designing of airport security 
procedures have been important cost additions. These 
measures have also had a major influence on passenger 
throughputs. Clearing security has become the most 
important source of delays in the passenger boarding 
process. Security issues have had a negative effect on the 
air transport industry, as costs have increased with delays 
and inconveniences to passengers increasing as well. [1] 
In addition, cyber security1 has become an issue for many 
civil aviation organizations, because they rely on 
electronic systems for critical parts of their operations, 
and for many organizations their electronic systems have 
safety-critical functions.  
There are a number of reasons why the risks to civil 
aviation from malicious cyber activity are increasing, 
though principally because:  
- Much of the new IT technology being introduced 
raises potential security issues that are unfamiliar in 
the civil aviation industry; and 
- IT systems are becoming increasingly interconnected 
and interdependent, so organizations are exposed to 
risks caused by security weaknesses in other people’s 
systems. 
Today, air traffic is controlled using instructions issued 
from the ground by radio, with aircraft position 
determined by radar, and things have not substantially 
changed for 70 years. With increasing air traffic, today’s 
ATM system is beginning to hit its physical limits, 
particularly in terms of the number of aircraft that can be 
managed by human controllers within a given airspace. 
The industry has designed solutions to automate the 
                                                                
1 The protection of electronic systems from malicious electronic 
attack and dealing with the consequences of such attacks is 
encompassed by the term ‘cyber security’. It comprises 
managerial and technical activities, and relates to the electronic 
systems themselves and to the information held and processed 
by such systems.
routine part of ATM, which if put into place would 
greatly increase the number of aircraft that can be 
managed within a given airspace. This would leave the 
air traffic controller with the executive role rather than 
having to issue all the routine control instructions, which 
would be produced automatically by the system.  
The expected widespread use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) in the near future also raises new issues 
due to the increased importance of remote linkages and 
ground control stations.  
These and other air traffic control issues are being 
addressed by the introduction of new communication 
methods and technologies, which includes the use of 
internet-based solutions. The use of these increases the 
role of cyber security and exposes numerous 
vulnerabilities that do not exist in today’s more closed, 
proprietary, civil aviation systems. These cyber security 
vulnerabilities have the potential to jeopardize civil 
aviation safety and efficiency. [2] 
In this complex scenario, it is crucial to be aware of the 
interaction between security, safety and cost-
effectiveness.  
The setting and implementation of security measures 
come at a cost that must be assumed by ATM operators 
and, eventually, by costumers. It has been estimated that 
an increase of 1% in the costs of air transport would cause 
a decrease in flows within the range of 2% to 3%. 
However, security-based measures could increase total 
costs between 1% and 3%.  
Since the early 1990s, cost-effectiveness has become an 
increasing priority. However, since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, people have been paying more 
attention to facility security and safety issues. Security 
measures, such as those for anti-terrorism, must be 
considered not only with regard to the level of protection 
deemed appropriate, but also while emphasizing the 
integrated design process, identifying areas of synergy 
and potential conflicts between safety and security 
approaches, and highlighting cost-effectiveness 
opportunities within certain security and safety strategies. 
Given budgetary and other constraints, integrating 
secure/safe and cost-effective design objectives oftentimes 
requires compromise and trade-offs. [3]  
DORATHEA (Development Of a Risk Assessment 
meTHodology to Enhance security Awareness in ATM) is 
a research project co-funded by the European 
Commission Directorate-General of Home Affairs, in the 
frame of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence 
Management of Terrorism and other Security-related 
Risks Programme, with the aim of developing a common 
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methodology for carrying out risk, threat and 
vulnerability assessments for ATM protection. It is 
envisaged that only a common methodology can provide 
the necessary basis for a coherent implementation of 
measures to protect European ATM critical infrastructure 
and clearly define the respective responsibilities of all 
relevant stakeholders. 
DORATHEA aims at increasing the awareness of ATM 
operators through an innovative security risk assessment 
methodology for ATM systems that:  
- Can be adopted either by state-of-the-art ATM 
systems as well as legacy/proprietary systems, 
allowing for the assessment of the new risks that 
their interconnection may (and, indeed, will) 
introduce. 
- Is based on existing and well-established security 
standards already in use by the industry, including 
the ICAO [7], the CC [8] and the ISO 27005 [9], and 
extend them to cover the ATM security scenario.  
- Is complementary with the risk assessment 
methodology currently being developed within 
SESAR and other EU projects in ATM security. 
2. The Need for a DORATHEA Security  
Risk Assessment Methodology 
Recent vulnerabilities that have been discovered and 
attacks that have been executed (e.g., refer to [4]) prove 
that the security of ATM systems is always under the 
spotlight, which is also confirmed by public entities (e.g., 
refer to [5]). Furthermore, the increasing complexity of 
ATM systems due to the pervasiveness of emerging 
technologies and the growing number of daily flights 
creates the conditions for the rise of unpredicted threats 
that may, potentially, turn into dramatic events. This is 
also driven by the on-going update of legacy/proprietary 
systems with new technologies and their connection to 
innovative systems, which creates a new environment 
with new threat vectors, for which these systems were not 
prepared when they were designed. As such, given that 
the ATM plays a critical role in supporting the overall 
airspace/aviation system, the security risk assessment of 
ATM should be a major concern and a top priority.  
Presently, the ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding 
Civil Aviation, one of the main references for threat and 
risk assessment in the ATM domain, offers little help in 
identifying and prioritizing threats according to time and 
budget constraints. On the other side, new guidelines are 
on the way, such as those currently being developed in 
the Sub-work Package (SWP) 16.2 of the Single European 
Sky ATM Research (SESAR) project, which focuses on 
ATM security frameworks, methodologies, tools and best 
practices.
The proposed methodology is an extension of the ICAO 
ATM security guidelines and is based on the strong 
points of the Safety Assessment Methodology defined by 
EUROCONTROL.  
It comprises three phases (see Figure 1): 
- SecFHA (Security Functional Hazard Assessment)
aims at evaluating how secure the system needs to 
be in order to achieve a tolerable risk. It is a process 
that, by evaluating system functionalities, 
identifying potential security hazards and assessing 
the consequences of their occurrence for the system, 
produces the system security objectives.  
Therefore, SecFHA inputs comprise the system 
functionalities, while knowledge about security 
hazards’ consequences and SecFHA outputs are the 
security objectives of the system. 
- PSSecA (Preliminary System Security Assessment) 
aims at evaluating whether the proposed 
architecture is expected to achieve a tolerable risk. It 
is a process that produces system requirements 
related to security (security requirements) in order 
to satisfy all the security objectives defined in 
SecFHA process.  
- SSecA (System Security Assessment) is a process to 
demonstrate that the system as implemented 
achieves a tolerable risk (i.e., satisfies the security 
objectives identified in the SecFHA) and that the 
system elements meet the security requirements 
specified in the PSSecA. 
Figure 1. DORATHEA Security Risk Assessment Methodology 
Overview
2.1 Security Functional Hazard Assessment (SecFHA)  
SecFHA is a top-down iterative process, starting at the 
beginning of the development or modification of an air 
navigation system and which aims to determine how secure 
the system needs to be. 
The steps to be performed during the SecFHA are: 
- To identify all potential security hazards associated 
with the system; 
- To identify security hazard effects on system 
functionalities; 
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- To assess the impact of security hazard effects; 
- To derive a security objective, in terms of maximum 
tolerable likelihood of occurrence of a security 
hazard.
2.1.1 Identification of all Potential Security Hazards 
The identification of all potential security hazards is 
performed through the: 
1. Identification of all the functionalities that the 
system under evaluation is expected to provide; 
2. Definition of a sub-set of functionalities containing 
only those system functionalities that are relevant 
from a security point of view (i.e., the functionalities 
that have to be protected). 
The selection of these functionalities will take into 
account: 
- How critical the functionality is from a 
security point of view (i.e., the loss or the 
corruption of such functionality due to an 
attack would have a high impact on people, 
equipment and procedures).   
- How “attractive” the functionality is from an 
attacker’s point of view: an attacker could 
decide to attack a functionality on the basis 
of the effort needed to perform the attack in 
terms of costs, the time needed to prepare the 
attack, the skills required to achieve the 
attack, the equipment required to be able to 
perform the attack, and the likelihood of 
being identified during the attack.  
3. Definition of all the potential security hazards as 
any condition, event or circumstance that could 
lead to the loss or corruption of such functionalities. 
2.1.2 Identification of a Security Hazard’s Impact 
All the possible consequences of the security hazard on 
the system will be identified and the impact of these 
consequences will be established.  
This impact is represented by a number from 1 to 5, as 
reported in Table 1. To obtain this evaluation, the impact 
of the security hazard’s effect(s) must be evaluated on 
each of the SESAR security impact areas (refer to [6]). A 
comparison should not be made between impact areas - 
they should be evaluated independently. 
The final impact value for each security hazard’s effect 
will be the maximum impact level from this evaluation. 
2.1.3 Security Objectives’ Identification 
The security objective specifies, for each identified 
security hazard, the maximum tolerable likelihood of its 
occurrence, given its assessed impact. 
In particular, it will be linked to the likelihood of a loss or 
corruption of functionality due to an attack.  
For each identified security hazard, the security risk 
associated with it will be evaluated as follows: 
Security Risk = Lsh * Ic (1)
5 4 3 2 1
Impact Areas Catastrophic Critical Severe Minor No impact / NA
IA1: Personnel Fatalities Multiple severe 
injuries 
Severe injuries Minor injuries No injuries 
IA2: Capacity Loss of 60%-100% 
capacity
Loss of 60%-30% 
capacity
Loss of 30%-10% 
capacity 
Loss of  up to 10% 
capacity
No capacity loss 
IA3: Performance  Major quality abuse 
that makes multiple 
major systems 
inoperable 
Major quality abuse 
that makes the 
major system 
inoperable 
Severe quality abuse 




No quality abuse 
IA4: Economic  Bankruptcy or loss of 
all income 
Serious loss of 
income  
Large loss of income  Minor loss of 
income 
No effect 
IA5: Branding  Government and 
international 
attention 
National attention Complaints and local 
attention 
Minor complaints No impact 











IA7: Environment Widespread or 
catastrophic impact 
on the environment 
Severe pollution 
with a long-term 
impact on the 
environment 
Severe pollution 
with a noticeable 
impact on the 
environment 
Short-term impact 
on the environment 
Insignificant   
Table 1. SESAR Security Impact Areas 
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Table 2. Risk Classification Scheme in ATM 
Where:
− Lsh indicates the likelihood of a given security hazard;  
− Ic indicates the impact of the consequence of the 
vulnerability on the security of the system (people, 
procedures, equipment).  
The Risk Classification Scheme (see [6]) is used in order 
to fix the maximum tolerable likelihood of a given 
security hazard, given its assessed Impact, in order to 
achieve a tolerable risk.
The likelihood of an attack is defined as follows: 
- Very Frequent: likely to occur often;
- Frequent: likely to occur several times;
- Occasional: likely to occur sometimes;
- Rare: unlikely but which may occur exceptionally;
- Extremely Rare: unlikely to occur during the 
lifetime of the system. 
2.2 Preliminary System Security Assessment (PSSecA) 
The objective of the PSSecA process is to evaluate whether 
the proposed architecture is expected to achieve a tolerable risk. 
PSSecA is a top-down iterative process, conducted during 
the system design phase of the system lifecycle. A PSSecA 
should be performed for a new system or else each time 
there is a change to the design of an existing system. In 
the second case, the purpose of PSSecA is to identify the 
impact of such a change on the architecture and to ensure 
the ability of the new architecture to meet either the same 
or new security objectives. 
The essential pre-requisite for conducting a PSSecA is a 
description of the high level functions of the system. 
This phase aims at deriving the security requirements for 
each individual system element under evaluation 
(people, procedure and equipment) in order to satisfy the 
security objective of the system. 
The system architecture can only achieve the security 
objectives established during the SecFHA, provided that 
the architecture elements meet their security 
requirements.
The PSSecA starts with the identification of all the assets 
that provide the functionalities associated with the 
security objectives identified during the SecFHA. 
According to [6], the assets will be classified as: 
- Primary assets: these are the intangible activities, 
information and services that contribute to having 
the functionalities of the system to be protected (i.e., 
those specified in the security objectives). 
- Supporting assets: these are the physical entities that 
enable the primary assets.  
They can consist of various types, including, for example, 
hardware, software, operating systems, business 
applications, networks, storage media, relays, 
communication interfaces, personnel, sites, premises, 
utilities, subcontractors, authorities and organizations.  
A security objective is satisfied if the primary assets that 
provide the functionalities associated with it are 
protected.
The primary assets are protected if, and only if, the 
supporting assets supporting them are not attackable. 
Next, the apportionment of security objectives into 
security requirements allocated to the system elements is 
performed through two analyses: 
- Attack Tree Analysis (ATA): this is a functional 
analysis that that identifies the logical combination 
of consequences arising from attacks, leading to 
the non-fulfilment of the security objectives. The 
focus is on the consequences for primary assets. 
The output of this analysis will be the list of attacks 
that can impact a given security objective (linked 
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to one or more primary asset) with an assigned 
likelihood. 
- Identification of Vulnerability and Effects 
Analysis (IVEA): this is a physical analysis and 
aims at evaluating whether the supporting assets 
linked to a given security objective are vulnerable to 
the identified threats. 
The combination of ATA and IVEA analyses allows the 
identification of how critical the supporting assets are 
and, consequently, enables the definition of the security 
controls in a cost-effective way. The security controls will 
be traced to those system requirements that will become 
security requirements. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the PSSecA process. 
Figure 2. PSSecA Overview
2.2.1 Attack Tree Analysis (ATA) 
The ATA is a functional analysis that identifies the 
logical combination of consequences arising from 
attacks and leading to the non-fulfilment of the security 
objectives. 
The focus is on the consequences for primary assets. 
Starting from the likelihood of the security objective (the 
top event), the attack tree analysis allows for the 
identification of the likelihood that an attack will 
successfully lead to the non-fulfilment of the security 
objective. If an attack is associated with two different 
values of likelihood, the most stringent value is 
considered. 
2.2.2 Identification of Vulnerability  
and Effects Analysis (IVEA) 
IVEA is performed on the physical components. The 
objective of this analysis is to identify the system 
vulnerabilities, evaluate how an attacker can use them 
(i.e., a threat that exploits the vulnerability), and what the 
consequences of such an attack are. 
The input of this analysis will be the design information 
of the system that allows for the establishment of which 
supporting assets support the primary assets that provide 
for the functionality associated with a given security 
objective. The analysis follows the following steps: 
1. The list of supporting assets is considered; 
2. The vulnerabilities of these supporting assets are 
identified; 
3. The list of potential threats is considered; 
4. Each threat in (3) will be traced to the supporting assets 
in (2) if they are vulnerable to it (i.e., if the threat can 
exploit the vulnerability of the supporting asset); 
5. The effect of the threat will be evaluated (in order to 
identify the primary asset affected by it).  
The IVEA will be in table format:  
2.3 System Security Assessment (SSecA) 
System security assessment is the last phase of the 
methodology.
This phase aims at evaluating whether the implemented 
architecture achieves a tolerable risk. 
SSecA is a top-down iterative process led during system 
integration, validation and on-site acceptance.  
The process produces assurance that the security 




Vulnerability Threat Effect(s) Likelihood Security Controls Likelihood after 
mitigation












The consequences are 
related to the impact on 
the primary asset(s), 
supported by the 
associated physical 










measures to be 
applied to the 
supporting asset 
in order to 
mitigate the risk 
The resulting 
likelihood after 
the application of 
the security 
controls
Table 3. IVEA 
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The objective of the SSecA is to collect evidence and to 
provide assurance that: 
- Each system (people, procedure, equipment) element 
as implemented meets its security requirements; 
- The system as implemented satisfies its security 
objectives throughout its operational lifetime (until 
decommissioning); 
- The system satisfies users’ expectations with respect 
to security; 
- The system achieves a tolerable risk. 
The correct implementation of the security controls will 
be demonstrated through: 
- Verification and validation activities. 
3. Case Study Application: Controller-Pilot  
Data Link Communications 
The Air Ground Datalink (AGDL) communication system 
has been selected to validate the proposed methodology. 
In particular, the controller-pilot data link 
communications (CPDLC) application provides a means 
of communication between the controller and the pilot, 
using a data link for ATC communication. As such, 
CPDLC is a means of digital communication between 
aircraft and ATCO, allowing for data exchange in a 
digital text format. 
There are two types of CPDLC messages: 
- Downlink messages, which are CPDLC messages 
sent from the aircraft; 
- Uplink messages, which are CPDLC messages sent 
from a ground system. 
The CPDLC application is used by the following services [10]: 
- ATC Communication Management (ACM) service 
provides automated assistance to the aircrew and 
current and successive controllers in conducting the 
transfer of ATC communications. The ACM service 
encompasses the transfer of all controller/aircrew 
communications, - both the voice channel and the 
data communications channel used to accomplish 
the ACM service. The ACM service is completed 
prior to using any other CPDLC service. 
- ATC Clearance (ACL) for exchanging clearances 
and requests between the current data authority 
ATSU and flight crew. An aircraft under the control 
of an ATSU transmits reports, makes requests and 
receives clearances, instructions and notifications. 
The ACL service describes the dialogue procedures 
to be followed to perform these exchanges via 
air/ground data communications. The service  
description states the exchanges that can be conducted 
via data communications, the rules for the combination of 
voice and data link communications, and any abnormal 
mode requirements and procedures. 
- ATC Microphone Check (AMC) for instructing 
pilots to check that the aircraft is not blocking a 
given voice channel. The AMC service allows a 
controller to send an instruction to all CPDLC-
equipped aircraft in a given sector at the same time 
in order to instruct flight crews to verify that their 
voice communication equipment is not blocking the 
sector’s voice channel. This instruction will be 
issued only to those aircraft for which the controller 
currently has responsibility. 
- Departure Clearances (DCL) for exchanging 
departure clearance, request and start-up messages 
between the current ATSU and grounded aircraft to 
prepare for its departure. Where local procedures or 
a flight category require, flights intending to depart 
from an airport must first obtain a departure 
clearance from the C-ATSU. The process can only be 
accomplished if the flight operator has filed a flight 
plan with the appropriate ATM authority. The DCL 
service provides automated assistance for 
requesting and delivering departure information 
and clearance, with the objective of reducing 
aircrew and controller workloads and diminishing 
clearance delivery delays. 
3.1 SecFHA 
An analysis of CPDLC functionalities is performed in 
order to identify security hazards. According to the 
classification of effects, security objectives are identified: 
Security Objectives Description 
SO-1 The likelihood of an out-of-
sequence CPDLC message 
shall be less than occasional 
SO-2 The likelihood of the denial of 
CPDLC services shall be less 
than extremely rare 
SO-3 The likelihood of a loss of 
integrity of CPDLC messages’ 
exchange shall be less than 
rare 
SO-4 The likelihood of the theft of a 
CPDLC message shall be less 
than rare 
SO-5 The likelihood of the reception 
of a fake CPDLC message shall 
be less than rare 
Table 4. CPDLC Safety and Security Objectives 
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The situation will develop 
slowly: not all aircraft will 
receive corrupted messages 
and take action at the same 
time.  
The controller will have time to 
deal with all impacted aircraft. 
Rare The allocation and 
use of privileges 
shall be restricted 
and controlled 
Occasional
Table 5. IVEA example 
3.2 PSSecA 
ATA is performed in order to analyse those primary 
assets potentially affected by the identified safety and 
security objectives. 
Figure 3. ATA example 
IVEA is performed in order to analyse any supporting 
assets potentially affected by the identified safety and 
security objectives and to identify safety and security 
requirements.
4. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is the definition of a new 
methodology for carrying out security risk assessment in 
the ATM domain.  
Countermeasures must be considered at the design 
phase, identifying areas of synergy and potential conflicts 
between safety and security approaches, and highlighting 
cost-effectiveness opportunities within certain security 
and safety strategies.  
The proposed methodology allows for the identification 
of countermeasures in a systematic way. 
Countermeasures can be adopted as security system 
requirements at the design level.  
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For demonstrative purposes, the methodology has been 
applied to the real case study of an approach and landing 
flight phase scenario, with a special focus on controller-
pilot data link communications systems. 
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